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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to investigate the impact of an important 
aspect of an organizational context, specifically organizational culture, 
and different types of compensation schemes on strategy surrogation. 
Strategy surrogation occurs when managers focus on the measures in the 
strategic performance measurement systems (SPMS) on which they are 
compensated and completely or partially lose focus on the overall strategic 
objectives of the organization. This study utilized a 2x2 between-participants 
experimental design that manipulates organizational culture (control-
dominant vs. flexibility-dominant) and the type of compensation scheme 
(fixed pay vs. pay-for-performance). The study was conducted online with 
80 participants from the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) as proxies 
for managers. The results show that employees operating under a control-
dominant culture do not surrogate more than employees operating under a 
flexibility-dominant culture. Additionally, the type of organizational culture 
does not moderate the relationship between incentive systems and strategy 
surrogation. However, employees operating under a pay-for-performance 
compensation scheme significantly surrogate more than employees 
operating under a fixed pay compensation scheme. The study contributes 
to the incentives and organizational culture literature as well as strategy 
surrogation research by examining institutional factors that may inhibit or 
exacerbate surrogation. Additionally, the study contributes to the judgment 
and decision-making literature by highlighting employees’ decision-making 
outcomes under different compensation schemes.        
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INTRODUCTION
Strategy surrogation has been identified as one of the possible unintended 
consequences of the use of a Strategic Performance Measurement Systems 
(SPMS) (Choi, Hecht & Tayler, 2012, 2013). Strategy surrogation occurs 
when managers focus on the measures in the SPMS on which they are 
compensated and completely or partially lose focus on the overall strategic 
objectives of the organization (Choi et al., 2012, 2013). For example, 
consider a firm pursuing a customer-focused strategy and measuring 
customer satisfaction using a satisfaction survey score. Choi et al. (2013) 
argue “to the extent that those scores imperfectly measure customer 
satisfaction, managers’ strategy-related judgments and decisions may be 
flawed if they surrogated customer satisfaction with the survey scores” (p. 
106).
The purpose of this research was to investigate the impact of an 
important aspect of organizational context, specifically organizational 
culture, and different types of compensation schemes on strategy 
surrogation. Organizational culture is defined as a set of dominant values, 
beliefs, and assumptions that govern how people behave in organizations 
(Henri, 2006). According to the competing values model, organizational 
culture can be characterized as either control-dominant, which values 
stability and accountability, or flexibility-dominant, which values 
invention and innovation (Quinn & McGrath, 1985; Quinn, 1988; Quinn 
& Rohrbaugh, 1983). This study examined the impact of each of these 
cultural characterizations on strategy surrogation. Furthermore, the study 
builds on the prior work by Choi et al. (2012) by investigating whether the 
type of organizational culture, flexibility- or control-dominant, exacerbates 
or mitigates the impact of compensation scheme on strategy surrogation.
According to the Inattentional Blindness Theory, when individuals 
concentrate on a particular object or event, they often fail to notice other 
relevant and distinctive objects of interest that are located outside their 
field of focus. Using this theory, this study proposes that individuals 
operating in a control-dominant organizational culture will exhibit more 
strategy surrogation than individuals operating in a flexibility-dominant 
organizational culture. In a control-dominant culture, individuals may be 
more blinded toward an overall strategic objective and less motivated to 
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look beyond the performance metric, as what gets measured will receive the 
most attention (Burney & Widener, 2013). Additionally, this study predicts 
that when individuals are paid for performance, they are motivated to meet 
or exceed performance targets and have little or no incentive to look beyond 
these metrics. Thus, individuals paid for performance will exhibit more 
surrogation than individuals paid a fixed wage. Finally, this study predicts 
that a flexibility-dominant culture will reduce strategy surrogation more 
under a fixed pay scheme than a pay-for-performance scheme compared 
to a control-dominant culture. 
This research used a 2 (culture: control-dominant vs. flexibility-
dominant) x 2 (compensation scheme: fixed pay vs. pay-for-performance) 
between-participants experimental design. To examine the hypotheses 
in this study, an online experiment was conducted using 80 Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers as proxies for managers. The study 
consisted of two parts. In the first part, the participants were asked to read 
a short case scenario, and at the end of the case, they were asked to make 
some decisions. In the second part, participants were asked several post-
experimental questions and demographic questions. The participants were 
randomly assigned to four conditions. All participants were paid $2.50 for 
participating, and additional research compensation up to a total of $9.00 
depending on their randomly assigned condition and their decisions.  
The results suggest that the type of organizational culture does not 
influence managers’ propensity to exhibit strategy surrogation. Specifically, 
managers operating in a control-dominant organizational culture do not 
exhibit more strategy surrogation than managers operating in a flexibility-
dominant organizational culture. However, the results show that the type of 
compensation scheme strongly influences employees’ tendency to exhibit 
strategy surrogation. Specifically, the results indicate that employees 
compensated using a pay-for-performance compensation scheme have a 
higher tendency to use the measures of SPMS as a surrogate for strategy 
constructs than the employees compensated using a fixed pay scheme. This 
result is in support of the Inattentional Blindness Theory. These results 
imply that employees operating under a pay-for-performance scheme will 
be less likely to notice relevant information that is beyond their current 
focus when making decisions compared to employees operating under a 
fixed pay scheme. 
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This study contributes to research and practice in several ways. 
First, this study contributes to prior research by exploring whether 
organizational culture, as a form of informal management control system, 
influences strategy surrogation. There has been limited research examining 
informal management control systems from the organizational culture 
perspective (Dent, 1991; Henri, 2006). The results show that organizational 
culture does not influence surrogation. However, there could be some other 
institutional factors that influence surrogation. Second, the result shows that 
employees compensated under a pay-for-performance scheme significantly 
surrogate more than employees compensated under a fixed pay scheme. 
The results corroborate prior research findings in managerial accounting 
on strategy surrogation. Overall, this study contributes to the incentives 
literature by highlighting conditions under which incentive systems can be 
used to refocus employees’ attention. 
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section discusses the literature 
and hypotheses development, section III discusses the experimental method 
and design, section IV provides the results, and section V discusses the 
conclusion and opportunities for future research.
BACKGROUND LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT
Surrogation
“The primary purpose of measurement is to communicate 
the state of other things. Figures produced as an output of 
measurement have no utility in themselves apart from their 
function to represent the state of other objects. Things or 
phenomena that are used to convey information about the state 
of something else are called surrogates.” 
(Ijiri 1975, p. 40)
Surrogation often occurs because perfectly capturing the construct 
of interest is difficult in reality (Ijiri, 1975). For example, prior literature 
shows that accounting measurement provides only a surrogate or 
symbolic representation of the economic reality in an organization, while 
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decision makers are interested in the underlying reality (Bedford, 1968). 
Measurement is defined as a special language that signifies real-world 
phenomena by means of numbers and the relations among those numbers 
that are predetermined within the number system (Ijiri, 1975).  The purpose 
of measurement is not just to capture the figures, but also “to represent a 
given relation(s) among objects by predetermined relation(s) among the 
numbers” (Bedford, 1968, p. 272). Hence, an individual may think that 
measurement is the end, and fails to understand that it is just the means to 
an end, which may result in surrogation (Ijiri, 1975).
Strategy Surrogation
Strategic Performance Measurement Systems (SPMS) have been 
described as any system in which there is a link between financial and 
nonfinancial performance measures and strategy in order to align individual 
actions within an organization with the organization’s strategy (Webb, 
2004). Although aligning individual actions with organizational strategy 
is important, transparency in performance measurement systems has been 
identified as one of the keys to a functioning and effective SPMS (Kaplan & 
Norton, 1996). Managers ideally should be able to “see through” the metrics 
of measurement of a strategically linked performance measurement system 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1992), because a perfect measure of the construct of 
interest is rare (Choi et al., 2012). When performance metrics are difficult 
to “see through” (Kaplan & Norton, 2000) and the performance goals often 
are difficult to achieve  (Webb, 2004), utilization of the SPMS may result in 
strategy surrogation (Choi et al., 2012, 2013).
According to Choi et al. (2012), strategy surrogation occurs in SPMS 
when individuals in an organization “fail to fully appreciate the fact that 
measures are merely representations of strategic constructs, and act as 
though the measures are the constructs of interest” (p.1135). To completely 
capture a construct of interest in an SPMS is practically impossible. For 
example, university administration may try to capture the strategic construct 
of teaching effectiveness through student evaluations; however, because the 
faculty members are aware that their performance evaluation will depend 
on students’ perceptions, they may decide to give students higher grades 
towards the end of the semester in order to get a better evaluation. In this 
example, the faculty members have surrogated the students’ evaluations 
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for teaching effectiveness. This study explores whether institutional factors 
such as organizational culture could be used to encourage or discourage 
managers from exhibiting such dysfunctional behavior.
Limited studies have examined this important concept of strategy 
surrogation in accounting. Choi et al. (2012) examined whether and how the 
use of strategically linked performance measures for compensation purpose 
affects managers’ propensity to exhibit strategy surrogation. Drawing upon 
the Attribute Substitution Theory, their study showed that when managers’ 
compensation is based on a single measure of a strategic construct of 
interest, managers are more likely to surrogate than when the compensation 
is based on multiple measures of a strategic construct. Surrogation often 
occurs in a complex and fast paced decision-making environment in an 
organization, where managers often rely on an easily accessible heuristic 
for their judgment and decision-making (Kahneman & Egan, 2011). Hence, 
managers has a tendency to attach more value to a singular measure of a 
strategic construct compared to multiple measures, especially when it is 
easier for them to focus on more salient items (Kahneman & Egan, 2011; 
Simons, 2000). 
In a similar manner, Choi et al. (2013) examined how managers’ 
involvement in strategy surrogation influences their propensity to surrogate 
strategic constructs with compensated measures. Their study suggests that 
in order to mitigate the impact of strategy surrogation in an organization, 
managers must be involved in choosing strategy measures. They demonstrate 
that managers’ involvement in strategy deliberation without involvement 
strategy selection may not necessarily reduce surrogation. Considering the 
importance of the SPMS in an organization (Campbell et al., 2015; Chenhall, 
2005; Dent, 1990) and the potential hindering effect of strategy surrogation 
on the effectiveness of SPMS (Choi et al., 2013), prior research has called 
for future research that  examines other institutional factors that possibly 
could inhibit or exacerbate strategy surrogation (Choi et al., 2012).
Organizational Culture
Organizational culture and management style appear to be 
interdependent throughout the lifecycle of a performance measurement 
system; and this interdependency is dynamic in nature (Bititci et al., 2006). 
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Management style needs to evolve as the life cycle of the performance 
measurement system and organizational culture evolves (Bititci et al., 
2006). For an organization to compete in a competitive, dynamic, and 
global environment, the organization must be willing to develop and 
implement performance measurement systems that lead to a participative 
and consultative management style and organizational culture. Such an 
organizational culture also must support implementation and the operating 
effectiveness of performance measurement systems (Bititci et al., 2006). 
Bititci et al. (2012) have called for future research to obtain a better 
understanding of management style and organizational culture that would 
facilitate the implementation of SPMS.   
Performance measures play an important role in motivating employees 
to achieve organizational goals (Bititci et al., 2012; Ittner & Larcker, 1998); 
however, prior studies have shown that work-place environments influence 
the relationship between the effectiveness of performance measurements and 
employee outcomes (Cravens, Oliver & Stewart, 2015). Considering the 
interplay between  organizational culture and effectiveness of performance 
measurements, certain performance measurements and management 
styles may be counterproductive to overall organizational goals in a 
particular organizational culture (Bititci et al., 2012). The initial belief that 
organizations that are managed through measures perform better is now 
being challenged (Bititci et al., 2006; Johnson & Broms, 2000). Johnson 
and Broms (2000) show that organizations should move beyond “managing 
by results” to “managing by means.” Thus, organizations should encourage 
systemic thinking among their employees rather than drive work with 
only financial targets (Johnson & Broms, 2000). The managing-by-means 
environment creates a flexible, enjoyable, and more productive working 
condition; the managing-by-results environment leads to a controlling work 
environment, which may not necessarily lead to an increase in productivity 
(Johnson & Broms, 2000). One important institutional factor that could 
impact the effectiveness of the SPMS in an organization is the values and 
culture of the organization (Bititci et al., 2006).
Henri (2006) described organizational culture as “the shared values 
(what is important) that interact with an organization’s structures and control 
systems to produce behavioral norms (the way we do things around here)” (p. 
79). The deinition of an organizational culture is broad in the management 
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and accounting literature; however, this study draws upon the competing 
values model of organizational culture (Henri, 2006; Quinn & McGrath, 
1985) to examine strategy surrogation. Organizational culture is an important 
concept because it can either motivate or demotivate employees to achieve 
overall organizational goals (Bititci et al., 2006; Bititci et al., 2012; Choi et 
al., 2012, 2013). Although managing-by-results is a form of a management 
control system that is synonymous with terms such as formality, rigidity, and 
conformity, it may not necessarily lead to an increase in productivity (Henri, 
2006; Johnson & Broms, 2000). Managing-by-means is an inspirational 
method of encouraging employees to realize extraordinary results in a 
sustainable way, which is synonymous with terms such as adaptability, 
spontaneity, and responsiveness (Henri, 2006; Johnson & Broms, 2000).
   
Quinn and McGrath (1985) developed the Competing Values Model of 
organizational culture. The model consists of four quadrants that represent 
four different organizational cultures and their embedded theories of 
effectiveness: rational, consensual, hierarchical, and developmental cultures. 
From these four quadrants, the flexibility/control axes and internal/external 
focus axes emerge. For the purpose of this study, the current focus will be on 
the flexibility and control axes because the goal of this study is to examine 
how the trade-offs between flexibility (which could improve invention and 
innovation) and control (which could improve stability and accountability) 
affect strategy surrogation (Quinn & McGrath, 1985).
From a practical perspective, neither absolute flexibility nor absolute 
control exists in any organization (Henri, 2006). Establishing absolute 
flexibility in an organization leads to disorderliness, instability, and chaos. At 
the same time, establishing absolute control discourages novelty, inspiration, 
and creativity. In every organization, an element of flexibility and controlling 
values exists (Quinn, 1988). Hence, Henri (2006) explicitly states that the 
“distinction between cultural types associated with control and flexibility 
values is not a dichotomous split but instead the extremes of control/
flexibility continuum” (p. 80). This study, similar to Henri (2006), refers to 
control values organizations as organizations reflecting a control-dominant 
culture, and flexibility values organizations as organizations reflecting a 
flexibility-dominant culture. For example, working in public accounting can 
be used to illustrate a control-dominant cultural environment where auditors 
must strictly follow the audit program when carrying out the audit process. 
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In this type of environment, auditors easily can surrogate the audit program 
for a quality audit, not realizing that it is merely providing guidance; the 
audit program does not necessarily translate to audit quality because it is the 
minimum requirement. In contrast, managers working in an environment 
where there is no formality or rigidity will have a different perspective to the 
metrics of their performance measurements. The managers will tend to see 
that performance metrics are used to provide mere guidance, which implies 
that they provide a means to the end, but not to the end itself. This type of 
cultural environments can be referred to as a flexibility-dominant culture. 
Psychology theory on attention capture has found that when individuals 
concentrate on another object, event, or thing, they often fail to notice salient, 
distinctive, and unexpected events around them, a phenomenon known 
as inattentional blindness (Simons, 2000). For example, a driver may fail 
to notice a pedestrian while trying to make a right turn at a red stop light 
because his/her focus is on the red light, or a person may fail to notice a 
friend in the cinema while trying to find an empty seat because he/she is not 
paying attention to anything in the cinema hall other than the empty seat 
(Simons & Chabris, 1999; Simons, 2000).  Traditional attention capture in 
psychology literature can be divided broadly into two categories: implicit 
attentional capture and explicit attentional capture. Implicit attentional 
capture is a situation where an observer is able to ignore something he/she 
expects, but knows to be irrelevant. However, explicit attentional capture, 
also known as inattentional blindness, is a situation where an observer fails 
to notice something that is potentially relevant, but that he/she does not 
expect (Simons, 2000). 
Choi et al. (2012) define strategy surrogation as the inability of 
managers to realize that performance measures are merely representations of 
strategic constructs and to assume that these measures are the constructs of 
interest. Choi et al. (2012) suggest that future research should examine other 
institutional factors that could inhibit or exacerbate strategy surrogation. 
The type of cultural environment is one of those factors that could influence 
managers’ propensity to surrogate. In a cultural environment that is control-
dominant, managers may find it difficult to consider salient and potentially 
relevant information when making decisions compared to managers that 
operate in a flexibility-dominant environment. Due to rigidity, formality, 
and conformity characteristics of a control-dominant culture, managers may 
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demonstrate a greater tendency to over focus on the performance measures 
and lose focus of underlying constructs of interest, which the performance 
measures are representing. Alternatively, considering the responsiveness, 
adaptability, and spontaneity characteristics of the flexibility-dominant 
environment, managers may have more incentive to see beyond the 
performance measures; hence, they may be less likely to ignore salient 
and potentially relevant information than managers in a control-dominant 
organizational culture. Using the Inattentional Blindness Theory, the 
following hypothesis is proposed:
H1: Managers operating within a control-dominant organizational culture 
will exhibit more strategy surrogation than managers operating within 
a flexibility-dominant organizational culture. 
Incentive Systems, Performance Measurement and Strategy 
Surrogation
Incentive systems have been examined from different dimensions in 
the accounting literature. For example, reporting structures may be classified 
as vertical incentive systems where team members report observations of 
their peers’ efforts to management, or horizontal incentive systems that allow 
team members to directly control the actions of each other. As the level of 
team identity increases, the horizontal approach becomes more effective 
relative to the vertical approach (Towry, 2003). Measuring how employees 
react to incentives is very important to performance measurement, and 
most importantly to the SPMS (Chenhall, 2005; Burney & Widener, 2013). 
Burney and Widener (2013) examined whether the extent to which 
an SPMS is coupled with strategy affects employee performance indirectly 
through motivational characteristics such as perceived self-efficacy and 
perceived psychological contract. Their study showed that properly aligning 
an SPMS-based incentives plan tightly with strategy facilitates internalized 
motivated behaviors (Burney & Widener, 2013). The ultimate goal of the 
SPMS is to translate overall organizational strategy, which is intangible, 
into tangible objectives and measures, and to ensure that organizational 
outcomes are improved through a better and clearer communication of 
an organization’s strategy to its employees (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). To 
achieve this goal, employee incentive systems often are linked to the SPMS 
(Cianci et al., 2013). 
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Incentive systems are used to draw attention to, motivate, direct and 
redirect employees’ performance in an organization in order to achieve an 
overall organizational goal (Baiman, 1990; Towry, 2003). Some argue that 
incentive systems improve performance; some argue that incentive systems 
reduce performance, and some argue that the presence of incentive systems 
has no effect on performance (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Burney & Widener, 
2013; Cianci et al., 2013; Pratt & Awasthi, 1990; Tuttle & Burton, 1999; 
Wright & Anderson, 1989).  
The effect of incentives depends on the ability of the decision-maker 
and the difficulty of the job tasks, not merely on the type and size of the 
bonus offer (Libby & Lipe, 1992). Cognitive evaluation theory suggests that 
incentives can decrease effort and task performance by focusing attention 
on the external rewards related to a task, which ultimately decreases 
intrinsic motivation (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Deci et al., 1981; Dillard & 
Fisher, 1990). Alternatively, the pressure-arousal-performance framework 
establishes that incentives, feedback, and justification generate pressures 
for decision-making and can lead to either better or worse performance 
depending on other psychological factors (Ashton, 1990; Baumeister, 1984, 
1986). Thus, generalizing the effects of incentive systems on performance 
measurement across different organizational environments is difficult 
(Pratt & Awasthi, 1990). As a result of this difficulty, more research that 
examines the relationship between different types of incentive systems and 
performance measurement in different organizational settings is needed 
(Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002).    
Strategy surrogation occurs when incentive compensation increases 
the salience of the incentivized measures of performance (Choi et al., 
2012; Ijiri, 1975). Specifically, Choi et al. (2012) investigate the influence 
of incentive compensation on managers’ propensity to use compensated 
measures as surrogates for strategic constructs. Their findings suggest that 
compensating managers based on a single measure of a strategic construct 
increases their propensity to use the compensated measure as a surrogate for 
the construct compared to compensating managers with multiple measures 
of a strategic construct.
Employees exhibit an increase in productivity of approximately 20 
percent when they are paid using a piece rate incentive system rather than 
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a high fixed wage (Shearer, 2004). The lowest weighted productivity scores 
occur when there is no incentive or only a creativity incentive (Kachelmeier, 
et al. 2008). Kachelmeier et al. (2008) suggest that the quantity of incentives 
will increase total quantity, and creativity incentives will increase average 
creativity; however, combining the two may not necessarily increase 
productivity (Kachelmeier et al., 2008). 
Pay-for-performance incentive compensation can be used to motivate 
additional cognitive effort, but that effort may not translate into optimum 
outcome for the organization (Libby & Lipe, 1992). Depending on the 
sensitivity of the cognitive process and outcome of the increased effort, 
increased pressure resulting from the pay-for-performance incentive may 
cause counterproductive results (Ashton, 1990; Kennedy, 1995). Managers 
may decide to redirect their effort to optimize their personal incentives by 
not showing any initiative to see beyond the measures that have been linked 
to the SPMS. It is practically impossible for an organization to accurately 
translate all its strategy into tangible objectives and performance metrics 
(Burney & Widener, 2013). Hence, fixed pay compensation motivates 
managers to engage in actions that are consistent with overall organizational 
strategic objectives and provides managers autonomy to use their initiative 
in order to achieve strategic objectives. Additionally, fixed pay compensation 
can be used to build trust between the managers and the organization, 
because managers equate fixed pay with an increased level of trust; i.e., they 
are trusted to do their job without additional incentives that are associated 
with pay-for-performance. However, using pay-for-performance linked to 
the SPMS can be perceived by managers as a way of enforcing the use of 
SPMS, which may reduce innovativeness and creativity of the managers. 
The type of incentive system, fixed pay or pay-for-performance, may 
affect managers’ propensity to exhibit strategy surrogation. Specifically, 
using the psychology-based Theory of Inattentional Blindness, managers 
that are compensated by fixed pay are expected to surrogate less than 
managers that are compensated by a pay-for-performance scheme. Pay-for-
performance may encourage managers to focus more on the measures of 
performance in an attempt to optimize their incentives. Hence, managers will 
concentrate on the metrics rather than look beyond the metrics. However, 
when managers are compensated using fixed pay, they are expected to be 
more likely to rely on their intrinsic motivation to perform their job because 
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there is little incentive for them to over focus on the metrics of performance 
measurements. This implies that the managers operating under a pay-
for-performance scheme are expected to surrogate more than managers 
operating under a fixed pay incentive compensation. Thus, the following 
hypothesis is proposed:
H2: Managers operating under a pay-for-performance incentive 
compensation will exhibit more strategy surrogation than managers 
operating under a fixed pay compensation. 
Inattentional blindness suggests that employees will not notice salient 
and important events outside the scope of established performance measures 
while they are trying to focus on performance measures (Simons & Chabris, 
1999; Simons, 2000). Thus, when managers focus on a performance 
measure under a pay-for-performance incentive compensation and they do 
not see beyond performance measures, their propensity to exhibit strategy 
surrogation should be greater when the organization operates under a 
control-dominant culture compared to a flexibility-dominant culture. This 
is expected because a control-dominant culture encourages conformity, 
formality, and rigidity, and a flexibility-dominant culture encourages 
adaptability, spontaneity, and responsiveness. Additionally, pairing a 
pay-for-performance incentive compensation with a control-dominant 
organizational culture introduces another form of pressure on managers. 
This may make managers think that as long as they satisfy the pay-for-
performance requirements, they have no additional obligation to ensure 
that the overall organizational strategic objectives are met.
  
Managers may exhibit strategy surrogation consciously or 
subconsciously. Managers could consciously surrogate because managers 
may not be interested in paying attention to anything other than their 
performance metrics. This implies that there is no incentive for managers 
to see beyond the metrics of performance measurement. However, 
managers could subconsciously surrogate as a result of excessive pressure 
resulting from the combination of a control-dominant culture and a pay-
for-performance incentive compensation. A pay-for-performance incentive 
may motivate additional cognitive effort by the managers, but this may not 
necessarily translate into the outcome the organization expects. Similarly, 
pay-for-performance may encourage managers to be innovative, but 
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the innovation may be more toward managers’ personal benefits rather 
than organizational strategic objectives. Hence, managers will be more 
likely to surrogate when they are under a pay-for-performance incentive 
compensation than when they are under a fixed pay incentive scheme, and 
a flexibility-dominant culture will be more likely to reduce the propensity 
to exhibit surrogation. Thus, the next hypothesis is:   
H3: A flexibility-dominant culture will reduce strategy surrogation more 
under a fixed pay scheme than under a pay-for-performance scheme 
compared to a control-dominant culture.
EXPERIMENTAL METHOD AND DESIGN
Participants
To examine these hypotheses, an online experiment using 80 MTurk 
workers as proxies for managers was conducted. The participants were 
randomly assigned to four treatment conditions, with 20 participants per 
condition. All participants in this study were paid $2.50 for participating in 
this study, as well as additional compensation up to a total of $9.00 depending 
on their randomly assigned condition and their decisions. The majority of 
the participants were male (65%). Most participants were between 31-40 
years old (44%), with others aged 21-30 (35%), age 41-50 (13%), and over 
age 50 (9%). Most participants (46%) had a Bachelor’s degree, 29% had a 
high school diploma or equivalent, 19% had an Associate degree, 5% have 
a Master’s degree, and 1% had a Doctorate. Most participants (36%) had 
11-20 years of work experience, 28% had 6-10 years of work experience, 
16% had 0-5 years of work experience, 15% had 21-30 years of work 
experiment, and 5% had over 30 years of work experience. 
Experimental Design and Task 
This study utilized a 2x2 between-participants experimental design that 
manipulates organizational culture and the type of compensation scheme. 
Specifically, the study manipulated the organizational culture by describing 
a scenario in which an organization has either a control-dominant culture 
that values stability and accountability or a flexibility-dominant culture 
that values invention and innovation. The study also manipulated incentive 
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schemes by offering participants either fixed pay or pay-for-performance 
compensation. The participants were provided a hypothetical case about 
the company and were required to make some decisions. Specifically, the 
study consisted of two parts. In the first part, the participants were asked 
to read a short case scenario1 and at the end of the case, they were asked to 
make some decisions. In the second part, participants were asked several 
post-study questions and several demographic questions.   
The experiment was an online based study administered via the 
Qualtrics software and disseminated through MTurk. The opening screen 
is the informed consent page, which was approved by the IRB. If they 
agreed to participate, then participants proceeded to the transition screen, 
which further asked them if they have properly read the information on the 
consent page. At this point, participants could decide to go back to read the 
consent page again or move to the next page, which is the screening page. 
The screening page asks participants about their age and the general payment 
instructions that were included in the informed consent page. The general 
payment screening question asked the participants how much they are going 
to be paid for participating in the study. All participants were paid $2.50, as 
well as additional research compensation up to a total of $9 based on their 
compensation scheme and decisions. The participants were screened if they 
were less than eighteen years of age or they failed the screening question 
about payment instructions. Following the screening page is the introduction 
and instructions page. On this page, the participants were asked to assume 
they are the General Manager of Sparky City’s Water Treatment Plant and 
in charge of making changes to the water treatment process to reduce cost 
for the coming year. Participants were informed of the conversion rate of 
their compensation and the instructions on how to receive their payment for 
this study. A comprehension check question about their specific incentive 
compensation scheme was asked before participants are able to proceed to 
the case scenario. The comprehension check question asks the participants, 
“Which type of additional research compensation are you eligible to receive? 
YOU MUST ANSWER THIS QUESTION CORRECTLY TO CONTINUE 
PARTICIPATING IN THE STUDY.” Half of participants were randomly 
assigned to the fixed pay compensation scheme, and the other half were 
randomly assigned to the pay-for-performance bonus, which is 20% of the 
total cost savings to the plant.
1 This instrument is adapted from Akinyele, Arnold, Demek and Tian’s 2019 working paper. I would 
like to thank the authors for allowing me to adapt the case scenario for this study. 
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The case scenario highlights that the Water Treatment Plant is 
responsible for treating the water with chemicals to make it safe for use and 
consumption by the residents of Sparky City. A lower quality water supply 
may seriously affect very old, very young, or health impaired individuals, 
although it is never possible to make the water 100% safe. Yet, it still is the 
responsibility of the Water Treatment Plant to ensure that the water is safe 
for use. Sparky’s average number of microorganisms per billion gallons of 
water over the past three years was within the acceptable range. The Water 
Treatment Plant is planning to reduce operating costs and is considering 
changing the chemicals used to treat water. A consultant had provided nine 
different alternatives, all of which are within acceptable range quantitatively, 
but may have negative quality implications. As the General Manager, the 
participant must decide which water treatment alternative to implement 
based on this scenario.  
Independent Variables
Compensation scheme 
In this study, an experimental currency called “Lira” was used. Lira 
is converted into U.S. dollars at a rate of $1 for every 20,000 Lira, and 
participants are paid in cash at the end of the study through their MTurk 
accounts. The amount participants earn depends on their randomly assigned 
compensation plan as well as their decision on the water treatment alternative 
to be implemented. The participants in the fixed salary condition were 
paid 100,000 Lira, which was converted to U.S. dollars at the end of the 
experiment. The participants in the performance bonus condition were paid 
20 percent of the total cost savings to the plant.  
Organizational culture
Half of the participants were randomly assigned to the treatment 
condition with a control-dominant organizational culture, and the remaining 
half were randomly assigned to the treatment condition with a flexibility-
dominant organizational culture. In the control-dominant organizational 
culture condition, participants are informed in the scenario that the Sparky 
City Council is known to be controlling and rigid with their decisions related 
to cost saving. The City Council strives to maximize cost saving regardless 
of the warning from the consultant, as long as the alternative decision is 
within an acceptable range for standards of water quality. In the flexibility-
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dominant organizational culture condition, participants are informed in the 
scenario that the Sparky City Council is known to be flexible and adaptable 
with their decisions related to cost savings. The City Council strives to 
maximize cost saving, but also to consider any warning from the consultant. 
Dependent Variable
The main dependent variable in this study is the participant’s water 
treatment alternative to be implemented. The participant can decide between 
nine different water treatment alternatives, with corresponding cost savings 
to the plant as well as the microorganisms per billion (percent decrease in 
water quality). 
RESULTS
Manipulation and Comprehension Checks
Participants answered a comprehension check question before they 
begin to read through the case scenario: Which type of additional research 
compensation are you eligible to receive? Participants must answer this 
question correctly before they can proceed to the case scenario. The 
manipulation check was conducted later in the experiment to provide 
assurance that participants are aware of the facts that are vital to the 
successful operationalization of the variable. To verify the manipulation 
of the organizational culture, participants were  asked to indicate the level 
of their agreement/disagreement with the following statements: (1) Sparky 
City Council is known to be controlling and rigid with their decisions related 
to cost saving; (2) Sparky City Council focuses on making decisions that 
are within an acceptable range for standards of water quality, and considers 
only quantifiable metrics in their decision making process; (3) Sparky City 
Council is known to be flexible and adaptable with their decisions related 
to cost savings; (4) Sparky City Council focuses on making decisions that 
are within an acceptable range for standards of water quality, and considers 
quantifiable metrics and qualitative factors in their decision-making process. 
Statements 3 and 4 were reverse coded. See Table 1 for the descriptive 
statistics of the manipulation checks and the results of t-tests comparing the 
answers of those in the flexibility-dominant culture to those in the control-
dominant culture for each question. The results of the analysis show that the 
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organizational culture is significant for all the manipulation checks, which 
indicates the strength of the manipulation checks. 
Table 1: Organizational Culture Manipulations 
Descriptive Statistics and Test of Differences
Descriptions Organizational Culture
Mean 
(SD) 
[n]
t
Sig. 
(2 
tailed)
Sparky City Council is known to be 
controlling and rigid with their decisions 
related to cost saving
Control-dominant 6.35 
(1.292) 
[40] 10.366 <.001
Flexibility-
dominant
2.58 
(1.907) 
[40]
Sparky City Council focuses on making 
decisions that are within an acceptable 
range for standards of water quality, and 
considers only quantifiable metrics in 
their decision making process
Control-dominant 5.70 
(1.728) 
[40] 2.647 .010
Flexibility-
dominant
4.65 
(1.819) 
[40]
Sparky City Council is known to be 
flexible and adaptable with their decisions 
related to cost savings (Reverse coded)
Control-dominant 5.88 
(1.636) 
[40] 10.796 <.001
Flexibility-
dominant
2.20 
(1.400) 
[40]
Sparky City Council focuses on making 
decisions that are within an acceptable 
range for standards of water quality, 
and considers quantifiable metrics and 
qualitative factors in their decision-
making process (Reverse coded)
Control-dominant 4.10 
(2.122) 
[40] 5.648 <.001
Flexibility-
dominant
2.03 
(.947) 
[40]
Descriptive Statistics
The focus of this study was to examine managers’ propensity to 
exhibit strategy surrogation, which is operationalized by the water treatment 
alternative the manager decides to implement. Table 2 Panel A presents 
descriptive statistics of the managers’ decisions, and Figure 1 shows a 
graphical representation of the results. In the fixed pay condition, the mean 
(standard deviation) of the water treatment decision is 4.85 (2.58) when 
employees are operating under a control-dominant organizational culture, 
and 4.26 (2.38) when employees are operating under a flexibility-dominant 
organizational culture. In the pay-for-performance incentive pay condition, 
the mean (standard deviation) of the alternative water treatment decision 
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is 7.20 (2.26) when employees are operating under a control-dominant 
organizational culture, and 6.76 (2.41) when employees are operating under 
a flexibility-dominant organizational culture. The mean (standard deviation) 
of the total fixed pay is 4.56 (2.47); and the mean (standard deviation) of 
the total pay-for-performance is 6.98 (2.32). Similarly, the mean (standard 
deviation) of the total control-dominant culture is 6.03 (2.68); and the mean 
(standard deviation) of the total flexibility-dominant culture is 5.58 (2.68). 
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Test of Hypotheses
H1 posits that in a control-dominant organizational culture, managers 
may find it difficult to consider salient and potentially relevant information 
when making decisions compared to managers operating in a flexibility-
dominant organizational culture. Specifically, managers operating in 
a control-dominant organizational culture will exhibit more strategy 
surrogation than managers operating in a flexibility-dominant organizational 
culture. To test this conclusion statistically, Table 2 Panel B reports the 
overall ANOVA findings. The results show that managers operating in 
a control-dominant organization l culture do not surrogate more th  
managers operating under a flexibility-dominant org nizational cult re (F 
= 0.90, p = 0.345, two-tailed). 
H2 posits that managers that are compensated by a pay-for-performance 
scheme are expected to surrogate more than managers that are compensated 
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by a fixed pay scheme. Managers compensated with a pay-for-performance 
scheme are more likely to concentrate on the metrics of the performance 
measurement rather than to look beyond the metrics because they are 
unintentionally blinded to anything other than the metrics. Table 2 Panel 
B shows that managers operating under a pay-for-performance incentive 
compensation statistically surrogate more than managers operating under 
a fixed incentive compensation (F = 20.22, p < 0.001, two-tailed).
H3 posits that employees working in a flexibility-dominant culture 
will exhibit less strategy surrogation under a fixed pay scheme than under 
a pay-for-performance scheme compared to employees working in a 
control-dominant culture. The Inattentional Blindness Theory suggests that 
employees will not notice salient and important events outside the scope 
of established performance measures while they are trying to focus their 
attention on performance measures. It is predicted that a flexibility-dominant 
culture will reduce the propensity of employees to surrogate, and it will 
reduce it more under a fixed pay scheme than under a pay-for-performance 
scheme compared to a control-dominant culture. The results do not support 
the interaction hypothesis (F = 0.02, p = 0.891, two-tailed). 
Table 2: Main Results – Alternative Decisions
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics – Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size]
Organizational Culture
Incentive Pay Control-dominant Flexibility-
dominant
Total
Fixed Pay 4.85
(2.58)
[20]
4.26
(2.38)
[19]
4.56
(2.47)
[39]
Pay for Performance 7.20
(2.26)
[20]
6.76
(2.41)
[21]
6.98
(2.32)
[41]
Total 6.03
(2.68)
[40]
5.58
(2.68)
[40]
5.80
(2.67)
[80]
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Panel B: Results of ANOVA: The Effects of the Incentive Systems and 
Organizational Culture on Strategy Surrogation
Source Type III Sum of Squares d.f.
Mean 
Square F-Ratio p-value
Incentive Pay 117.41 1 117.41 20.22 <0.001
Organizational Culture 5.25 1 5.25 0.90 0.345
Incentive Pay x Organizational 
Culture 0.11 1 0.11 0.02 0.891
Error 441.24 76 5.81
Total 3254.00 80
CONCLUSION
This study examined the effect of an important organizational context, 
specifically organizational culture, and different types of compensation 
schemes on strategy surrogation. Strategy surrogation occurs when managers 
focus on the measures in the SPMS on which they are compensated and 
completely or partially lose focus on the overall strategic objectives of the 
organization (Choi et al., 2012, 2013). According to the competing values 
model, organizational culture can be characterized as control-dominant 
that values stability and accountability, or flexibility-dominant that values 
invention and innovation (Quinn & McGrath, 1985; Quinn, 1988; Quinn 
& Rohrbaugh, 1983). This study hypothesizes the main effect that managers 
operating in a control-dominant organizational culture will exhibit more 
strategy surrogation than managers operating in a flexibility-dominant 
organizational culture. Additionally, this study proposed that individuals 
paid for performance would exhibit more surrogation than individuals paid 
a fixed wage. Finally, this study hypothesizes that a flexibility-dominant 
culture will reduce strategy surrogation more under a fixed pay scheme than 
a pay-for-performance scheme compared to a control-dominant culture.
The study uses a 2 (culture: control-dominant vs. flexibility-dominant) 
x 2 (compensation scheme: fixed pay vs. pay-for-performance) between-
participants experimental design. An online experiment was conducted using 
80 Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers as proxies for managers. The 
study consisted of two parts. In the first part, the participants were asked 
to read a short case scenario, and at the end of the case, they are asked to 
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make some decisions. In the second part, participants were asked several 
post-study questions and demographic questions. The participants were 
randomly assigned to four conditions. All participants were paid $2.50 for 
participating, and additional research compensation up to a total of $9.00 
depending on their randomly assigned condition and their decisions.  
Consistent with prior literature (Choi et al., 2012), the results of this 
study show that managers using a pay-for-performance surrogate are 
compensated more than managers using a fixed pay. This result is supported 
by the Inattentional Blindness Theory. The results show that employees 
operating under a pay-for-performance scheme will be less likely to notice 
relevant information that is beyond their current focus when making 
decisions, compared to employees operating under a fixed pay scheme. 
There is no support for the hypothesis that managers operating in a control-
dominant organizational culture will exhibit more strategy surrogation than 
managers operating in a flexibility-dominant culture. 
This study contributes to research and practice in several ways. First, 
this study shows that employees compensated under a pay-for-performance 
scheme significantly surrogate more than employees compensated under 
a fixed pay scheme. The results corroborate prior research findings in 
managerial accounting on strategy surrogation. Specifically, this study 
confirms prior findings by Choi et al. (2012) that employees compensated 
on a single measure of a strategic construct with a pay-for-performance 
scheme exacerbate more surrogation of the construct relative to employees 
that receive a fixed pay scheme. Second, this study extends prior research by 
exploring whether organizational culture, as a form of informal management 
control systems, influences strategy surrogation. The results do not indicate 
that organizational culture is a driving force. Third, this study examines 
whether the type of organizational culture moderates the effect of incentive 
system on strategy surrogation. This study contributes to the incentives 
literature by highlighting conditions under which incentive systems can be 
used to refocus employees’ attention.
The results have certain limitations that suggest several avenues for 
future research. One reason for not finding support for the first hypothesis, 
about managers operating in a control-dominant organizational culture, 
could be associated with the saliency of organizational culture manipulation. 
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It could be that the participants were not able to internalize the different types 
of organizational culture. It is also possible that participants in the study 
may have focused more on the immediate impact of the payment scheme 
rather than on the broader impact of the organization culture. Future research 
should examine the effect of organizational culture on strategy surrogation 
in other contexts to ensure that the manipulation of organizational culture 
was not overpowered by the short term effects of the reward system used 
in my study. Future research also should examine other institutional factors 
that can influence employees’ propensity to exhibit strategy surrogation. 
Similarly, future research also can examine other important aspects of 
managerial accounting research that the type of organizational culture can 
impact. 
Strategy surrogation is an important, but difficult to examine, construct 
in managerial accounting (Choi et al., 2012, 2013). Most previous studies 
have used laboratory experiments to examine strategy surrogation. Future 
research can examine the concept of strategy surrogation using a different 
research approach such as field experiments or qualitative methods. Future 
research could examine this research question using a more controlled 
research environment. Regardless of the limitations of this study, this study 
contributes to our understanding of strategy surrogation in the managerial 
accounting literature  
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